

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ACDE-00 ISO-00 ERDE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00

H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01

PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

TRSE-00 NSC-05 BIB-01 NRC-05 /093 W

----- 080096

P R 171330Z MAY 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0987

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0219

NOFORN

VIENNA FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS ON MAY 16, 1975

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT SOVIET INVITATION, ON MAY 16, US REP HAD CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET REP KHLESTOV AND US DEPREP HAD SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET REP SMIRNOVSKY. BOTH INDICATED THAT SOVIETS DID NOT INTEND TO TAKE MAJOR NEW STEPS IN THIS ROUND OF THE VIENNA TALKS AND WERE WAITING FOR WEST TO MOVE. BOTH STRESSED NEED FOR WEST TO INCLUDE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN REDUCTIONS. SOVIET REPS DID NOT

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CONFIRM INFORMAL INDICATIONS AT END OF LAST ROUND THAT PACT

MIGHT BE WILLING TO DISCUSS DATA IN THIS ROUND. SOVIET MILREP COLONEL KAPITONOV ALSO TOOK CAUTIOUS LINE ON DATA IN TALK WITH DOD REP SAME DAY. COMMENT: SOVIETS REPS ARE OFTEN RESERVED IN INITIAL CONTACTS AT BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATING ROUNDS, SO THAT THESE REMARKS SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS DEFINITIVE. HOWEVER, THEY DO PROBABLY INDICATE THE OVERALL APPROACH THE EAST WILL FOLLOW DURING THE CURRENT ROUND. END COMMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. AT SOVIET REP KHLESTOV'S INVITATION, US REP HAD DISCUSSION WITH HIM ON MAY 16. THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS WERE MADE:

A. KHLESTOV SAID THE EAST CONTINUES UNWILLING TO DISCUSS DATA ON FORCES IN THE AREA BECAUSE THE WEST CONTINUES UNWILLING TO REDUCE NUCLEARS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS, AND AIR FORCES, AND TO INCLUDE REDUCTIONS BY THE FRG. KHLESTOV QUESTIONED WHETHER DISCUSSION OF DATA WOULD IN FACT ADVANCE NEGOTIATIONS IF THE TWO SIDES HAD SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT ESTIMATES OF THE STRENGTHS OF THE FORCES.

B. US REP SAID THAT DIFFERENCES IN ESTIMATES COULD IN PART COME FROM DIFFERENCES IN CATEGORIES OF FORCES INCLUDED IN THE ESTIMATES AND THAT THIS SOURCE OF DIFFERENCES COULD BE EXPOSED BY DATA DISCUSSION. US REP ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SOME GENERAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES AS TO DATA BEFORE ANY AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED AND THAT IN VIEW OF THE TIME REQUIRED TO REACH SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET THE DISCUSSION STARTED AND TO PROCEED IN PARALLEL WITH A CONTINUATION OF THE MORE DIFFICULT ISSUES WHICH THE SOVIETS WISHED TO DISCUSS. HE ADDED THAT THE CONTINUED EASTERN REFUSAL TO DISCUSS DATA TENDED TO SUPPORT THE VIEWS OF THOSE WHO WERE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE EAST IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

C. KHLESTOV REPEATEDLY MADE THE ASSERTION THAT THE MAIN BAR TO PROGRESS WAS THE WEST'S CONTINUED REFUSAL TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND AIR FORCES. HE ALSO ASSERTED THAT THE WEST'S FAILURE TO MAKE NEW MODIFICATIONS IN ITS POSITION IN THE FIFTH ROUND MADE PROGRESS MORE DIFFICULT AND

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SAID EAST HOPED FOR A WESTERN MOVE IN THE SIXTH ROUND. US REP RESPONDED THAT THE MOVES BY THE EAST TO DATE HAD BEEN OF SUCH LIMITED SCOPE THAT THE WEST FELT THAT THE EAST HAD NOT YET DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY WERE REALLY SERIOUS ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS.

D. KHLESTOV ALSO CHARACTERIZED THE CONTINUED UNWILLINGNESS OF THE GERMANS TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET AS A BAR TO

PROGRESS, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT STRESS THIS AS STRONGLY AS THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND AIRCRAFT POINT. US REP RESPONDED THAT, DUE TO THE DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF PARTICIPANTS, REDUCTIONS FOR THE GERMANS CONSTITUTED PARTIAL DISARMAMENT WHEREAS REDUCTIONS FOR THE SOVIETS COULD BE MERELY REDEPLOYMENTS AND THAT ACCORDINGLY, ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL GERMANS WERE WILLING TO TAKE THE CONSEQUENCES OF REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE, IT WAS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE WHY THEY FIRST REQUIRED ASYMMETRICAL SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND A SOVIET COMMITMENT TO PARITY OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

E. KHLESTOV CRITICIZED THE COLLECTIVE CEILING AS PERMITTING THE FRG TO INCREASE FORCES TO COMPENSATE FOR DECREASES BY OTHER ALLIES. US REP RESPONDED THAT THE IMPORTANT ITEM WAS FOR THE SOVIETS TO SHOW WILLINGNESS TO MAKE LARGER GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS IN A MOVE TOWARD PARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND THAT THE ISSUE OF CEILINGS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED AFTER PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON THE SHAPE OF REDUCTIONS.

F. KHLESTOV INDICATED THAT, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE EXPECTED LITTLE MOVEMENT IN THE SIXTH ROUND, BUT SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PRESERVE THE BUSINESSLIKE ATMOSPHERE OF THE TALKS. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD USE HIS INFLUENCE TO DAMPEN THOSE IN THE EASTERN DELEGATIONS WHO PREFERRED TO MAKE HARSHER STATEMENTS. HE SAID THAT, AT LEAST FOR THE SAKE OF APPEARANCES, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE PLENARY SESSIONS EACH WEEK.

G. KHLESTOV VOLUNTEERED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE TOPIC OF MBFR WOULD COME UP AT THE PROSPECTIVE MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02

INR-07 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03

PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00

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P R 171330Z MAY 75
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VIENNA FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

FROM US REP MBFR

3. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH US DEPREP, INITIATED
BY SOVIET REP SMIRNOVSKY, LATTER MADE THE FOLLOWING MAIN
POINTS:

A. MOSCOW AUTHORITIES HAD BECOME CONVINCED THE WEST
WAS HOLDING BACK ON MBFR AND THAT IT WAS WAITING FOR THE
END OF CSCE AND OF SALT II BEFORE IT MADE ANY MOVE IN THE
VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. US DEPREP SAID THAT SOME IN WEST HAD
MADE THE SAME ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET POSITION. PERSONALLY,
HE SAW NO OBJECTIVE REASON WHY PARTICIPANTS IN VIENNA TALKS
SHOULD MAKE PROGRESS IN THOSE TALKS DEPENDENT ON OUTSIDE
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EVENTS AND CONSIDERED THAT IT WAS UP TO SOVIETS TO SHOW
THEY WERE REALLY SERIOUS IN VIENNA BY MOVING BEYOND PRO-
CEDURAL SUGGESTIONS TO SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THE WESTERN
REDUCTION PROPOSALS.

B. IN RESPONSE, SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT THE US COULD NOT
EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT CALLING FOR WITH-
DRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES WITHOUT SOME KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT THE
GERMANS WOULD DO AS REGARDS REDUCTIONS.

C. SMIRNOVSKY ALSO STATED THAT THE US COULD NOT EXPECT THE
SOVIETS TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE WESTERN REDUC-
TION PROPOSAL AS LONG AS IT WAS ONE-SIDED WITH REGARD TO
THE FORCES COVERED AND OMITTED AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR FORCES.
HE MADE THIS POINT SEVERAL TIMES.

D. ASKED ABOUT PRE-RECESS INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE

EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS AND EXCHANGE DATA, SMIRNOVSKY MERELY REPEATED THE STANDARD EASTERN POSITION THAT SUCH AN EXCHANGE SHOULD FOLLOW RATHER THAN PRECEDE AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON REDUCTIONS. HE SAID THAT, AT THAT POINT, THE WEST WOULD EITHER RECEIVE FULL SATISFACTION ON DATA OR WOULD NOT HAVE TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT.

E. SMIRNOVSKY COMPLAINED THAT THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF A COLLECTIVE CEILING FOR THE FORCES OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF EACH ALLIANCE WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE GERMANS TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES.

F. US DEPREP MADE STRONG CASE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD GET MORE OUT OF MANPOWER LIMITATIONS IN AN AGREEMENT THAN THE WEST BECAUSE OF ITS GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY AND THE FACT THAT FORCES ON ITS TERRITORY WOULD NOT BE LIMITED. IT WAS THEREFORE LEGITIMATE TO ASK THE SOVIETS TO TAKE MORE REDUCTIONS THAN THE WEST. SMIRNOVSKY SAID MOSCOW DID NOT SEE IT THAT WAY. HE REMARKED THAT, AS FAR AS HE COULD SEE, BOTH SIDES WOULD BE OBLIGED TO CONTINUE MARKING TIME DURING THIS ROUND.

G. SMIRNOVSKY INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WOULD PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE FORTH-
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COMING MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

4. DOD REP MET ON MAY 16 WITH SOVIET MILITARY REP KAPITONOV AT LATTER'S INVITATION. KAPITONOV MADE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS:

A. HE REITERATED POINT THAT THE EAST COULD NOT MAKE ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT UNTIL ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO SPECIFIC REDUCTIONS.

B. HE ASKED WHETHER THE WEST WAS GOING TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS OF NUCLEARS AND AIR FORCES IN THIS ROUND.

C. KAPITONOV WAS EVASIVE WHEN ASKED WHETHER THE EAST PLANNED TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS OF DATA IN THE CURRENT ROUND. HIS FIRST LINE OF REPLY WAS THAT THE WEST KNEW AS WELL AS THE EAST THE REASONS FOR THE ERRORS IN WESTERN FIGURES ON WARSAW PACT FORCES. HE THEN TOOK THE LINE THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS EXCEPT IN A "LIMITED" GROUP. WHEN ASKED WHAT HE MEANT BY "LIMITED," HE SAID THIS ISSUE WAS SOMETHING THAT US REP PERHAPS SHOULD TAKE UP "PRIVATELY" WITH SOVIET REP. "THIS WAS ONLY A PERSONAL SUGGESTION, OF COURSE."

D. KAPITONOV COMPLAINED ABOUT THE INEQUITY OF THE US

REMOVING ONLY 29,000 SOLDIERS WITH NO EQUIPMENT WHILE THE
SOVIETS HAD TO TAKE OUT 68,000 AND "ALMOST 2,000 TANKS."
(FURTHER DETAILS OF THIS CONVERSATION BY AIRGRAM).

5. SIMILARLY NEGATIVE POINTS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF DATA EXCHANGE
WERE MADE BY SMIRNOVSKY TO UK REP ON MAY 15 AND BY SOVIET
DELEGATION OFFICER SHUSTOV TO UK DEPREP MAY 16 (DETAILS BY AIRGRAM.)R
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